Justification and limits for loans without a spouse. The non-assumption of co-responsibility by the spouse may be caused by the fact that the spouse of the joint liability is spared. He acknowledged that she had signed only for the sake of her husband – without even taking advantage of the contract. If spouses can finance a property together with a construction loan, the question arises, what happens with this loan, if both are divorced. Receipt credit. de in the test: Experience with credits without credit bureau: Who wants to take a credit, but a negative entry with.

Spouses are not eligible for Burst Credits.

Spouses are not eligible for Burst Credits.

“Joint and several liability can be immoral.” Especially if the spouse does not have their own capital or their own money “. med. Michael Üerlings, spokesman for the Rhine topics. Often, the destitute spouse assumes joint and several liability only because he wants to keep the marriage peace. “The court will then examine whether from the perspective of the spouse, apart from the personal distance, there are other understandable reasons for assuming joint responsibility.

He acknowledged that she had signed only for her husband – without even benefiting from the assignment. The joint and several liability in these cases violates morality – therefore, the Federal Court has decided in favor of the woman.

Wife and spouse tied to the loan

Wife and spouse tied to the loan

As a rule, credit institutions and savings banks grant security only. In most cases, the bonds are only used by a single bank, from which the bank then demands adequate security. So it is not uncommon for spouses to have a desire for credit, for example, to buy household items or the like. In many cases, it is not just the spouse who takes out the lending business for the credit institutions and savings banks as a contract and guarantor.

The bank also tries to include the spouse in the loan agreement. This means that not only the borrower is liable, in reality in practice mostly the man, but also the woman. For a better understanding of this problem, it is necessary to understand what credit security the bank usually needs.

If, for example, the personal income of a installment loan is insufficient, credit institutions and savings banks can demand mortgages, security assignments or guarantees as additional security. Of course, if the borrower marries, it is a good idea for the financial institution to include the spouse in the undertaking through a guarantee.

Probably the most common example of how credit institutions and savings banks hedge their claims is the so-called spouse’s guarantee, which is regularly issued by the woman. If only one spouse is included in the loan agreement, the spouse can transfer his / her credit balance to the other spouse, usually the wife, thereby relinquishing the institution’s indispensable security.

In most cases a contract with the wife or spouse will be required to avoid this problem. Before discussing the specific issue of the spouse’s guarantor, a short lecture on this legal institution will be given. The guarantee case is specified in 765 Civil Code (BGB).

As part of a guarantee agreement, the spouse takes on responsibility for the spouse’s obligations to the spouse’s bank. This applies if the woman has explicitly renounced this contradiction. Only if it comes to an unsuccessful execution, she can turn to the guarantor, in this case to her wife.

However, the bank can claim the woman immediately, excluding the complaint. 2. However, spouses’ guarantees are repeatedly the focus of criticism and in many cases have been the subject of judgments against banks and savings banks. This guarantee is often immoral and therefore invalid. The courts have accepted an immorality of the spouse’s guaranty, especially when the guarantor, the majority of whom were the spouse, was overburdened with accepting their duty and the word was given to the borrower only because of the pronounced emotional affinity.

In fact, it often happens that credit institutions and savings institutions demand pro-form guarantees from women who work as a housewife and therefore have no significant income. If the credit institutions exploit in this situation that the woman gave the guarantee, so to speak, only for the affection for her husband, the immorality of such a contract is probably plausible.

This is especially true if, due to its severe economic congestion, the woman is unlikely to even be able to pay in the long term the compounding of her asset or the garnishment portion of her remuneration as agreed in the loan agreement. In addition to the spouse’s guaranty, there are other security options for the bank.

If the wife is wealthy and has real estate, she can place a mortgage there as collateral for her spouse’s loan. In addition, the spouse may assign claims which he has against third parties to secure a loan. Reasonably, however, the complainant notes that under the recent jurisdiction of the EX.

Civil Senate of the Federal Court of Justice (since BGBHZ 128, 230 ff = BJW 1995, 592) is the demand of the economically overburdened spouse, who has campaigned for a loan volume beyond the usual consumer credit, has breached the morality under certain conditions. The plaintiff grants entrepreneurship loans for B.; The application for these loans can be made through any bank, which then acts as the principal bank and trusts the loans on its own behalf and for its own costs.

On 15 April 1991 the applicant, as the owner of the transport company of the same name, granted a participation loan of DEM 65 000 and on 21 August 1991 a further participation loan of DEM 58 000. Under the terms of the Federal Minister of Economics, the loan agreements stipulate that the spouse of the borrower is jointly and severally liable for the liabilities resulting from these agreements.

A gross financial burden – to which the plaintiff refers here – can become immoral even without the addition of special circumstances, if from no point of view a legally justified interest of the lender in a total debt can be determined to a coordinated extent (see also judgment of the Federal Court in the case of the Bundesgerichtshof and the Bundesgerichtshof in Case 01, 1331; 01, 402, 403 f; 00, 410, 411 – II.

The co-signature of the Loan Agreement of 15 December 1999 (p. 23 GA), which is the subject of the lawsuit, proves to be, according to the current state of affairs, together with her husband ML, the Defendant 1 as immoral and thus according to § 138 (1) HGB null and void.

The principles worked out by the Supreme Court to differentiate between true co-perpetrators and mere co-perpetrators have been correctly set out by the LG, but have been misapplied in the concrete case by accepting that the defendants are genuine co-debtors. Was legally sepa- rated on January 1, 1987, a loan from Deutsche Bank for Home Financing (DKB) for the acquisition of a condominium condominium, which became its sole owner, and granted the creditor a loan to secure the loan with a notarised contract dated January 25, 2007.

The land charges amount to DEM 212,000.00 plus 20% annual interest (21% default). The plaintiff, who at that time used her small sons and daughters as a housewife without own money and own capital, took over with the buyer as a joint debtor and because of the land charge amount of 212 the self-debtor.

plus default interest of the creditor against direct enforcement from this document. In order to assess whether the joint obligation of a spouse for a bank debt exceeding normal consumer credit is immoral as a result of the economic congestion, real common borrowers are consulted, have a vested interest in the granting of the loan and, in effect, the use of the loan have the same right of co-decision, and those who are formally co-debtors but only confronted with the lender as co-debtors for security purposes without real creditor status (see also para

In principle, BayernLB can not be accused of creating a hopeless situation with the liability claim for the borrower if married couples act as co-debtors in the common interest in lending and jointly generated revenues that enable them to obtain the loan without affecting their own Repayment of the livelihood (BGH No. 1999, 135).

In this way, however, the lending is presented in accordance with the present file situation and the description of the plaintiff, which can not be refuted. There are no specific indications that the defendant can only be presumed to have formally assisted for security purposes and that the Defendant did not oppose the plaintiff as an equivalent borrower to its spouse at the conclusion of the contract (to distinguish between co-borrowers and co-obligors and the BfG. HGH 2001, 815).

According to the contract documents, it is a “personal loan” for cash, which the adolescent spouses took up without earmarking. The installment loan (DM 40,000.00) with a duration of 59 months and an interest rate of DEM 899,32 per month is still within the range of normal consumer credits, such as those paid by juvenile couples to build a community budget.

The financial affairs of the plaintiff’s husband were first settled by the defendant with a checking account (account number 2041), on which an overdraft of up to DEM 20 000 was granted. The applicant had also applied for this procedure. After the advice of the tax adviser of the company that the operating cost financing on the current account is unreasonable, looking for the man of the plaintiff for lenders.

They also agreed that the parent company provided the claimant with a loan of DEM 7,000.00 to reduce the interest charge on a corresponding mortgage loan. The plaintiff also passed on the parent loan amounting to DEM 7,000 to the defendant.

The witness N. Ko. explained that the defendant had paid this amount in cash, accompanied by the plaintiff and her – the witness – presence at the savings bank. The following provisions apply to the liability asserted by the defendant: By a loan agreement dated 24 November 1997 (Sheet 44), the defendant took the R.-S. an initial loan of DEM 13,103.18, net of DEM 10 000, which he had lodged on 30 November 1997 in mont.